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George Papadoudis*
AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE 
THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY 
AND THE WELFARE STATE
Population ageing in Europe is undeniably a success story. At the
same time the new demographic mix is already challenging the old
social policy framework together with a series of underlying socioe -
conomic factors such as inequalities and stratifications. The wel-
fare state across Europe struggles among the current and projected
total cost of ageing and the current and projected needs of an
emerging ageing population. Pension, health care and long-term
care systems tend to treat the needs and abilities of the older indi-
viduals as if there is no variation among them. But all individuals
do not age following the same pattern. Divergent pathways over the
life course present different outcomes in later life. Without innova -
tive and targeted policy-making for the near and distant future the
ageing population is in danger to be trapped between ineffective
social support and inadequate family support (if any). 
* Researcher, National Centre for Social Research <gpapadoudis@net-
pads.eu>
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A long introduction
Population ageing is undeniably a success story. Despite being
a buzzword for many problems the fact that people are living
longer signifies in itself an enormous progress on global scale.
Bio logical ageing as an unprecedented extension of life, especial -
ly when it is accompanied by a healthier life, is an unquestio -
nab le advantage regarding the future of humanity. However, the
discussion on ageing as concerns the social sciences and poli-
tics is something different: the ageing population will be of cour -
se one of the dominant issues of the 21th century but more of-
ten than not in the aspect of a threat which challenges directly
and indirectly various societal norms and institutional arrange-
ments. The new demographic mix is already challenging the
old social policy framework. At the same time a series of under-
lying socioeconomic factors such as inequalities, discriminations
and stratifications keep pushing the traditional welfare state be-
yond its limits. The responses are currently delayed regarding
the former and still a long time coming regarding the latter. Fo -
cusing on Europe the responses vary significantly as well as their
results country by country. Despite the achievements of the Eu -
ropean welfare state in general there are clear distinctions and
differences in its effectiveness when cross country and within
country examination comes forward.
Contemporary Europe is changing once again while the post
war era seems a long past. The baby boomers have grandchil-
dren called the generation X. The millenniums (the next in line
age-cohort) is not even the most recent one. Birth rates are fal -
ling while longevity is rising. New challenges for the individual,
the family and the state are expected to radically change the
shape of the future in the old continent. The political agenda
and the social policy in all Europe are being transformed un-
der this new old-age reality. According to Eurostat’s available
data and its demographic projections there are very strong in-
dicators about that fact. The European population (EU-28) is
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projected to become older with the median age rising from 42.4
years in 2015 to 46.6 years in 2080. The share of the 65+ years
old part of the total population in the EU-28 is also projected
to increase from 19.2% (or 98 million persons) in 2016 to 29.1%
(or 151 million persons) by 2080. During the same period, the
oldest old (80+ years old) of the European population is pro-
jected to increase from 5.4% in 2016 to 12.7% by 2080 (Euro-
stat 2017). These projections indicate a radical change which is
undergoing for quite some time. By the beginning of 21st cen-
tury (2001) to 2016 the number of people aged 65 or older in the
EU-28 rose by 26.6%, while at the same time the overall popu -
lation of the EU-28 increased by just 4.5%. The old-age de-
pendency ratio (people aged 65+ relative to people aged 15-64)
was almost 25% in 2010 (and almost 30% in 2016) and it is pro-
jected to rise further and eventually reach 51.2% in 2070 (Euro -
pean Commission 2018a). This substantial increase (more than
double) over just six decades is capable to drastically alter the
European society and economy; whereas in 2010 there were four
persons of working age (15-64) for every person aged 65+ in
2070 the ratio is expected to be less than 2 to 1. No matter the
projection horizon the estimations are more than clear: the
EU as a whole as well as every member state will face an un-
precedented reality.
The picture above in its rate & ratio diversity feeds the po-
litical and scientific discussion at full blast. Together with ano -
ther set of indicators centered this time around the projected
cost of population ageing it builds a strong case about an on-
going and escalating crisis. Not surprisingly the public pension
schemes as well as the health care and long-term care systems
are the main focal points of this argument. In 2016 the EU-27
gross public pension expenditure was at 11.9% of their Gross
Domestic Product. This average brings together very different
situations on pension spending: while in Ireland the share of
GDP was at 5.0% (the lower limit of the distribution), Greece
(representing the upper limit) spent for public pensions 17.3%
of GDP. After many substantial reforms undertaken in every mem -
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ber state the level of expenditure is projected to rise (by 0.8%)
until 2040 and then decline (by 1.3%) until the end of the most
recent projection in 2070 (European Commission, 2018b). Tak-
ing under consideration that in 2016 the GDP of the European
Union amounted to almost €15 trillion (at current prices) eve -
ry single percentage point accounted for €150 billion. But the
total cost of ageing is not just pensions. While it is the main com -
ponent (almost half of it) the health care and the long-term care
costs as well as other social age-related expenditures have to
be taken into account. For the European Union the total cost of
ageing was 25% of GDP in 2016 and is projected to rise by 2%
to 4% until 2070 (European Commission, 2018b). Thus far, it is
clear that the ageing-related costs in the EU now and more im -
portantly in the near future represent a challenge for each mem -
ber state.
It is well documented that the ageing population accumu-
lates multiple pressures on public finances. Almost every Eu-
ropean country has undertaken major reforms concerning pub-
lic pension, health care, and long-term care systems during the
last 3 decades. In the case of public pensions, the effort was/is
concentrated on the aspect of the viability/sustainability and all
available projections verify that after a time period of 2 to 3
decades the state expenditures will in fact decline. Nonetheless,
the debate is still on: the financial or budgetary reforms may
ease the pressure on current and future welfare state across Eu-
rope but what about the ongoing and expected pressures on
aged individuals and their families? Their socioeconomic sta-
tus, their health care needs, and their chances to receive long-
term support (if necessary) do not appear secured or even rea-
sonably fulfilled now or in the long run. Different welfare sta -
tes under the umbrella of the non-unified model called Eu ro pean
welfare state have different responses and priorities while fa -
cing the challenges posed by population ageing. The extent of
the differences across country but also within country more of-
ten than not make the necessary adjustments on reforms’ pa-
rameters almost unattainable. Retirement ages, periods of con-
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tributions, and levels of benefits seem to move alongside the
ageing population as a demography story. But this is not all.
Addressing the needs and fulfilling the rights of today’s and
future old-age European population –regardless the exact age
of any future working definition– remains at the core of the
ar gument supported in this paper. This paper attempts to con-
tribute some key findings in that direction calling for more
thorough data-driven investigation and welfare state policy re-
design. Welfare state(s) of course have to be sustainable but as
long as this strive for viability goes together with an adequate
support for the people – the principal reason designed for.
The European welfare state continues to draw legitimacy from
an unparallel success post-war herstory against inequalities,
poverty, and discrimination. Its achievements on equal access,
opportunities, rights to health care, work, education (to name
a few) are based on active intervention (as opposed to an over-
all withdrawal). Unfortunately for now, the social ageing process
appears to undermine this successful past. Unresolved prob-
lems and new threats are challenging this efficient construction.
Letting up cannot be a legitimate response. Moving the burden
of ageing to families and individuals is not just a transfer of res -
ponsibility but also a loss of accountability for the state(s). And
without it the ageing crisis may be its final crisis. 
Ageing population: the big and (not so) 
distant picture
As Table 1 shows, by 2016 EU-28 total expenditures on social
protection reached almost 4 trillion Euro (slightly more than
28% of European Union’s GDP). The two main funding com-
ponents of social protection remain the social security contribu -
tions (55%) and the contributions by the general government
through taxes (40%). During the last 9 years’ available data, so-
cial spending at EU level increased by more than 500 billion Eu-
ro. The EU average on social protection expenditures in 2016
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% GDP Billion Euro Euro perinhabitant
2008 2016 Dif. 2008 2016 Dif. 2016
EU-28 25.9 28.1 2.2 3,399 3,911 513 7,658
Belgium 27.7 29.6 1.9 101 115 14 10,158
Bulgaria 14.7 17.5 2.8 6 8 2 1,105
Czechia 17.9 18.9 1 29 33 4 3,145
Denmark 28.9 31.1 2.2 73 83 11 14,554
Germany 27.2 29.4 2.2 711 862 151 10,467
Estonia 14.7 16.6 1.9 2 3 1 2,325
Ireland 20.2 15.8 -4.4 35 40 5 8,478
Greece 22.8 26.2 3.4 58 49 -9 4,538
Spain 21.4 24.3 2.9 242 257 15 5,527
France 30.8 34.3 3.5 615 738 123 11,065
Croatia 18.8 21.3 2.5 9 10 0 2,345
Italy 26.7 29.5 2.8 441 469 29 7,742
Cyprus 17.6 19.1 1.5 3 4 0 4,148
Latvia 12.1 15.1 3 3 3 1 1,709
Lithuania 15.9 15.4 -0.5 5 5 0 1,897
Luxembourg 20.9 21.9 1 8 11 2 18,355
Hungary 22.3 19.1 -3.2 24 22 -2 2,216
Malta 18.2 16.4 -1.8 1 2 0 3,417
Netherlands 26.1 29.5 3.4 172 197 26 11,577
Table 1. Total expenditures on social protection in EU-28, 
2008-2016 (% of  GDP & Euro at constant 2010 prices)
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was 7,658 Euro per inhabitant. According to the data above so-
cial Europe seems stronger than ever before. At the same time
the present and future socioeconomic reality of many Europeans
appear somehow to be under constant threat. From youth unem -
ployment to poor pensioners and from the working poor to
homemakers without social insurance the threat may well be
substantive. Persistent financial constraints and consecutive eco -
nomic crises bring forth a number of reforms which strive main-
ly for cost reductions. In fact, in a precarious situation like this
there is a real danger for those who actually have the greater
need for support. Furthermore, the substantial disparities on so -
cial protection across Europe confuse certain boundaries of the
current situation as well as its projections for the near future.
For example, Greece and the United Kingdom appear to have
an identical GDP proportion for social expenditures in 2016 but
this is perhaps the only similarity here: the per capita expen -
diture is almost double for UK while the total cost for social pro -
tection is more than ten times over. Even comparing the dif-
ferences between countries can be misleading. In the same exam -
101AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE
S o u r c e: Eurostat, 2019
Austria 27.6 29.9 2.3 83 94 11 10,790
Poland 19.3 20.3 1 66 88 22 2,320
Portugal 23.4 25.1 1.7 42 45 3 4,317
Romania 13.7 14.6 0.9 19 23 4 1,149
Slovenia 21.0 23.3 2.3 8 9 1 4,380
Slovakia 15.7 18.3 2.6 11 14 3 2,526
Finland 25.1 31.9 6.8 51 62 11 11,230
Sweden 27.9 29.6 1.7 102 124 22 12,509
United
Kingdom 25.7 26.2 0.5 488 543 56 8,278
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ple, an 0.5 increase between 2008 and 2016 for UK means 56 bil -
lion euro whilst for Greece an increase of 3.4 during the same
time means a decrease of 9 billion. Budget cuts or gene rous
spending can be both right or wrong depending on their actual
impact on people’s lives. Any kind of reform does not affect all
the people in the same way.
An alternative way to approach the welfare state in each
European country, other than its cost, is through its effecti -
veness. Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of people in poverty
or under social exclusion by member state and the extent of in-
come inequality respectively. For 2017 the EU percentage of peo -
ple at risk of poverty or social exclusion was 22.4% and the ine -
quality index estimated at 30.7 (where 0 represents perfect equa -
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Figure 1. Income inequality & poverty or social exclusion
in EU-28, 2017
S o u r c e: Eurostat, 2019.
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lity and 100 represents absolute inequality). In both cases the
Baltics, the Balkans and the Mediterranean countries are very
close or above the EU average followed by the Western Eu-
rope countries. Scandinavia and large parts of Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe can be found on the side of comparatively less po -
verty and inequality. Poverty and social exclusion as a multi-
dimensional process continues to be a common problem across
EU (Ba lourdos, 2014). Poverty index and Gini coefficient are in-
formative measures which allow for direct comparisons be-
tween countries and their applicability is strongly supported in
the field of economics, health and education. These measure-
ments provide this exercise with a point of departure attem -
pting to point out that the ageing population as a large part of
the whole po pulation in every country is something far from
an unvarying sum. Differences in income and living conditions
are substantial between countries as well as within countries
and this fact has crucial impact on the later life of every indi-
vidual. 
Projections like these presented in Figures 2 & 3 strike at
the core of the ageing crisis in Europe. Figure 2 illustrates the
decrease of the working population (15-64 age group) and the
increase of the elderly population (65+ age group) until 2070.
More specific, the former is a projected to decrease from 65.3%
in 2016 to 55.9 in 2070 and the latter to increase from 19.5% in
2016 to 29.2% in 2070. Among other factors this is expected to
signify a proportional increase for the old-age dependency ratio
(population aged 65+ as a % of the population aged 15-64) from
30 to 52 during the same period. Even worse for the European
finances, the economic old-age dependency ratio (inactive popu -
lation aged 65+ as a % of the employed population 15-64) is pro -
jected to increase from 44 to 70 by 2050 and remain as high for
the next 20 years. 
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Figure 2. Working age & elderly population as % of total population
and Old-age dependency ratios in EU-27, 2016-2070
S o u r c e: European Commission, 2018a.
Figure 3 shows ten projection scenarios regarding the total
cost of ageing as GDP percentage (the baseline defined at 25.4%
of GDP in 2016). The reference scenario projecting a cost increa -
se by 2% until 2045 followed by a gradual decrease until 2070 at
26.6%. Almost in every available scenario at EU level the pro-
jected increase will be escalated during 2045-2050. With the hig -
her employment rate of older workers scenario, the maximum
increase of the total cost of ageing will be limited to 1.2% of GDP
while with the AWG risk (extra costs for health care & long-term
care) scenario the increase may be as high as 3.3% reaching 29%
by 2070. In every other scenario the total cost is projected to
increase but fluctuating: lower increase by linking retirement
age to increases in life expectancy, higher migration, higher em -
ployment rate, or higher increase by lower migration, lower em -
ployment rate, lower fertility, higher life expectancy. It is evi-
GEORGE PAPADOUDIS104
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dent that the primary concern of the projections above at EU
level remain the budgetary impact mostly due to demographics
despite the considerable uncertainties around the future needs
of the ageing population. 
Figure 3. Total cost of ageing as % of GDP – 10 scenarios
in EU-27, 2016-2070
S o u r c e: European Commission, 2018a.
As shown in Figure 4, life expectancies at 65 vary widely from
one EU country to another. For example, a 65 years old male in
Latvia or Bulgaria is expected to live 14.1 more years on ave -
rage while a male of the same age in France can expect to live
another 19.6 years. Females live longer than males in every EU
country by 3.3 years on average; the discrepancy appears to be
significantly higher in the Baltics and lower in Scandinavia. As
concerns the healthy life years at 65 the gender discrepancy is
much lower (0 in Slovenia or Hungary and 1.5 years in Fran -
ce). But country by country the differences in healthy life years
after the age of 65 vary substantially: from 4.1 (Slovakia) to 15.8
105AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE
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(Sweden) for females and from 3.8 to 15.4 years (same coun-
tries) for males. At a glance, Figure 4 shows that reaching the
age of 65 in Latvia or Slovakia (either female or male) is some-
thing quite different from what is expected on average in the
same situation in Sweden or Malta. In all, the big picture for the
whole Europe may be strikingly misleading. At EU level the ave -
rage of 10 more healthy life years or 20 more years in total for
any person at 65 is just that; an average which gathers very dif-
ferent life histories, outcomes and expectations. 
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Figure 4. Healthy life years & life expectancy in absolute value
at 65 in EU-28 by gender, 2017
S o u r c e: Eurostat, 2019. 
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Moving from macro to micro: 
informative measurements & policy gaps
All individuals defined as the aged do not getting older follo wing
one single homogenous pattern. It is quite possible to categorize
the aged population in as many ways there are available in their
life herstories. The availability of new, reliable and comparable
data may support an attempt to explore closer than before the
differences and common features across Europe. This paper ar-
gues about the necessity of more detailed pictures and investi -
gations when it comes to issues as crucial for the society as this
of population ageing. Especially regarding the current, ongoing
and future needs of so many individuals and their families (if
any). In order to contribute in this direction our analyses use
new empirical evidence which may reinforce the scientific at-
tempt for more fact-based examinations and more effective pub -
lic policy.
This movement from macro to micro is facilitated by micro
data derived from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe.1 SHARE is a multidisciplinary and cross-natio nal pa -
nel database on health, socio-economic status and social and fa -
mily networks of individuals aged 50 or older. For comparison
reasons this paper uses the most recent data by the 7th wave
of the survey for 25 European countries in 2017. The countries
which have participated in this wave cover effectively all geo-
graphical regions in the continent as well as the prominent typo -
logy of welfare states throughout Europe, ranging from the North
& Scandinavia (Denmark, Sweden & Finland) to the South &
the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malta & Cy -
prus) and from Eastern Europe & the Baltics (Poland, Czechia,
Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia & Estonia) to
Balkans (Bulgaria, Romania & Croatia) and Central Europe
107AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE
1. This paper uses data from SHARE Wave 7 (DOI: 10.6103/SHARE.w7.
700), see Börsch-Supan et al. 2013 for methodological details.
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(Austria, France, Luxembourg, Germany & Belgium). The sam-
ple used for the analyses below contains information by 72,000
individuals aged 50 plus and/or 49,000 households all weighted
by probability computations.2
In this representative sample the average age of the fema -
le respondents is 67.9 while the male respondents’ average age is
66.2 years old. Females represent 54% of the sample and males
represent the remaining 46%. Almost half of the sample (47%)
is younger than 65 years old while the oldest old part of it (aged
80 or more) is almost 16%. Around 62% of the respondents is
mar ried and living with a spouse while another 8% never mar-
ried and another 9% is divorced; almost 19% is widowed. More
than 25% lives alone (single-person household), almost 50% li -
ves in a 2-persons household and 10% lives in 4+ persons hou -
sehold. About 16% of the respondents have completed just the
primary education and 4% never went to school but on avera -
ge for the whole sample the years spent in education are 12.
More than 50% of the sample is retired from own work while
a third is active (29% employed & 3% unemployed) in the labor
market. Furthermore, there are 9% homemakers and 4% per-
manently sick or disabled. Half of the sample answered that,
on balance, they look back in their lives ‘often’ with a sense of
happiness although for more than a third the answer was ‘so -
metimes’ and for 13% the answer was ‘rarely’ or ‘never’. It is to
be expected of course that the sample varies broadly across Eu -
rope at most topics covered by the personal interviews.
A key fact derives rather easily from above: the ageing po -
pulation has much in common as well as many differences. The
sample description may emphasize similarities and dissimilari -
ties but at this point that is perhaps only about larger or smal -
ler groups of the sample under investigation. On the other hand,
the strict eligibility rules and the random selection of the sam-
ple allows for validated representations of the whole population.
GEORGE PAPADOUDIS108
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sehold probability weights. 
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While the former may point out several initial findings the lat-
ter strengthens the scientific procedure by which important da-
ta could be useful for policy-oriented analysis. For example, the
old age population is not another synonym for the pensioners,
especially those retired from own work. A smaller but signifi-
cant part of the older individuals has never done any paid job
or haven’t participated into any contributory pension scheme.
Another example is about the household sizes or types. Living
in a single-person household does not necessarily mean living
alone. A family member may be across the street or on the same
floor. By definition a household is not equal to a family but ser -
ves primarily as sample unit for the analysis. At the same time,
compared to other household types the person who lives in a
single household may differ from other households regarding for
instance the potential of receiving or giving help (inside or out -
side the family) when necessary. This may be very important
considering cases of poor health conditions which last long. 
Table 2 represents three health status indicators by specific
income quintiles (lowest & highest).3 All three indicators are ba -
sed on negative outcomes. As concerns the self-perceived health
(five scales: excellent, very good, good, fair poor) the cut-off
point for the specific self-perception is set to less than ‘good’
pointing out the remaining choices of ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ health.
In total, 42% of the population find themselves having fair or
poor health. The disparities are substantial: from 70% in Esto -
nia to 26% in Slovakia. This range is quite different regarding
the population into the first- & fifth-income quintile. At the lo -
west quintile (poorer) the estimation of facing a fair or poor health
range from 83% in Estonia to 34% in Greece. At the highest quin -
tile the estimation of facing a fair or poor health range high
in the Baltics (around 40%) and low in Sweden and Denmark
(around 10%). There is no country with a difference between
109AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE
3. The income quintiles are weighted on individual level and estima -
ted on household level through total household net income for which equi -
valent scales (OECD version) were applied.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 06:05:37 |
GEORGE PAPADOUDIS110
Fair or poor
self-perceived
health
2+ chronic
diseases
3+ mobility,
arm function
& fine motor
limitations
Total 1st Q 5th Q Total 1st Q 5th Q Total 1st Q 5th Q
Austria 34.9 52.6 20.8 46.9 52.5 35.2 24.7 40.5 14.4
Germany 44.6 66.0 24.8 55.4 65.1 40.4 25.2 40.4 12.5
Sweden 28.1 50.6 8.1 39.2 55.0 20.9 15.2 33.0 3.8
Spain 42.9 50.4 26.0 55.0 54.2 44.0 27.9 34.5 14.9
Italy 42.5 54.9 31.2 42.2 50.8 30.7 24.3 33.0 15.4
France 36.3 52.8 24.4 47.9 55.0 41.0 24.6 38.1 14.8
Denmark 27.3 43.3 14.9 43.9 60.5 31.7 17.2 30.7 7.8
Greece 30.0 34.0 21.7 48.9 51.8 40.1 32.0 33.7 24.0
Belgium 31.7 41.6 19.7 54.6 58.7 48.2 25.8 36.9 13.4
Czechia 27.6 38.8 18.1 56.3 66.5 43.8 26.8 40.9 12.8
Poland 49.9 63.9 37.7 58.3 62.2 49.8 36.0 48.2 22.4
Luxembourg 38.3 57.1 26.0 52.2 54.8 39.0 25.2 37.2 16.1
Hungary 55.5 68.1 44.1 53.4 63.3 42.6 32.3 42.2 19.4
Portugal 51.3 73.2 41.8 46.3 46.6 43.5 14.8 23.0 12.5
Slovenia 38.5 53.6 23.6 44.4 50.1 38.0 26.1 45.9 13.0
Estonia 69.7 83.4 47.0 47.8 55.4 31.3 31.6 46.6 11.0
Croatia 46.0 56.4 35.0 55.1 61.3 44.2 41.6 50.9 30.7
Lithuania 60.6 70.5 39.2 54.8 59.1 40.2 35.7 46.8 11.9
Bulgaria 38.1 56.1 17.3 42.3 58.3 20.3 30.0 48.8 10.6
Table 2. Health status indicators for 50+ population
by income quintiles in SHARE-W7 countries (EU-25), 2017
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the two extreme quintiles lower than 12 points (Greece) while
there are two in which the difference exceeds a threshold of
40 points (Sweden & Germany).4 This subjective measurement
reveals significant disparities and inequalities between coun-
tries and also within countries. Regarding the chronic diseases,
the focus of this analysis is on the respondents who acknowled -
ged suffering by at least two conditions (presented to them with
a specific showcard).5 The analysis of this particular indicator
111AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE
4. It has to be noted that all probability weighted mean values and the
differences between quintiles country by country are statistically significant
with p<0,001.
5. Conditions that a doctor had inform the respondent about it and
that is either currently being treated for or bothered by this condition: 1. A
heart attack including myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis or any
other heart problem including congestive heart failure, 2. High blood pres-
sure or hypertension, 3. High blood cholesterol, 4. A stroke or cerebral vas-
cular disease, 5. Diabetes or high blood sugar, 6. Chronic lung disease such
as chronic bronchitis or emphysema, 10. Cancer or malignant tumor, inclu -
ding leukemia or lymphoma, but excluding minor skin cancers, 11. Stomach
or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer, 12. Parkinson disease, 13. Cataracts, 14. Hip
fracture, 15. Other fractures, 16. Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, organic brain
syndrome, senility or any other serious memory impairment, 18. Other af-
fective or emotional disorders, including anxiety, nervous or psychiatric
problems, 19. Rheumatoid Arthritis, 20. Osteoarthritis, or other rheumatism,
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
Cyprus 31.2 41.7 19.6 51.0 57.2 38.0 21.9 35.2 11.3
Finland 39.5 54.8 22.5 58.4 59.3 52.6 16.1 25.8 9.3
Latvia 65.7 74.6 42.1 48.9 51.9 30.5 30.2 37.9 10.6
Malta 41.8 56.5 26.1 48.8 53.7 41.5 23.1 31.3 15.5
Romania 50.4 56.6 34.4 42.2 39.1 36.7 36.6 35.0 28.5
Slovakia 26.1 45.0 11.5 30.1 46.4 16.5 23.4 35.5 11.1
Total 41.9 56.6 27.3 50.2 56.7 39.2 26.7 37.9 15.4
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appears to support effectively the previous results. Half of the
population is either being treated for or bothered by a num-
ber of health conditions. The variation between countries is once
again large (from 30% to almost 60%). This stands also for each
separate income quintile group but with very different ranges:
39 to 67% for the lowest and 17 to 53% for the highest. The dif -
ferences between them also vary extensively, almost 2% in Ro-
mania while 38% in Bulgaria when the mean value for all coun-
tries is almost 18%. The last indicator in this series is about par -
ticular difficulties in everyday life.6 The cut-off point for this
analysis is set to three difficulties concerning the individual’s
mo bility, arm function & fine motor skills. Once more the weig -
hted mean values per country vary broadly: from 14% in Portu -
gal to 42% in Croatia. On average one quarter of the whole
population seems to suffer by three or more such difficulties.
The range inside each income quintile group is almost equal
(27 points) but their limits are significantly different: 23-50
points for the first quintile and 4-31 for the fifth. All three in-
dicators and their specifications highlight similar empirical evi -
dence. Health and income inequalities are serious problems for
the ageing European population; for now, and for the not so
distant future. Ageing appears to have a significant effect and
the same stands for the socioeconomic status represented in this
exercise by the income variable.
One of the main characteristics and strengths of the Euro -
pean welfare state lies in its long tradition of fighting against
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21. Chronic kidney disease, 22. Other conditions. It is informative to men-
tion that 14,818 individuals acknowledged 0 conditions while 65 acknowl-
edged more than 10 conditions.
6. Difficulties doing each of the following everyday activities and are ex -
pected to last no less than three months: 1. Walking 100 meters, 2. Sitting
for about two hours, 3. Getting up from a chair after sitting for long periods,
4. Climbing several flights of stairs without resting, 5. Climbing one flight
of stairs without resting, 6. Stooping, kneeling, or crouching, 7. Reaching or
extending your arms above shoulder level, 8. Pulling or pushing large obje -
cts like a living room chair, 9. Lifting or carrying weights over 5 kilos, like
a heavy bag of groceries, 10. Picking up a small coin from a table.
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poverty. Progressively this fight took many forms across Europe
prioritizing alternatively active or passive interventions. Tradi-
tionally the main fields for these interventions remain the la -
bour market and the education system recognizing their crucial
role as production and reproduction structures. For the welfare
state, and especially for one striving for equality, this is a con-
tinuing struggle. For an older individual, especially one after his
or her retirement, the results of these interventions (successful
or not) appear rather stable. Successful or unsuccessful life paths
may have different outcomes. Figure 5 shows at a glance a series
of cross-country differences about the ability of households to
make ends meet. This household population has at least one hou -
sehold member aged 50 or more. This representation focuses
on households which make ends meet with some or great diffi -
culty (as opposed to fairly easily and easily). This variable empha -
sizes the affordability of basic goods & services and can also
represent a subjective measurement of poverty or material de-
privation especially when the household make ends meet with
great difficulty (Fonseca, Kapteyn, Lee, Zamarro & Feeney,
2013). On average, 40% of the households fall down in this group.
Greece and Bulgaria exceed even the most pessimist projec-
tion on this matter while 16 out of 25 countries exceed the
weighted mean value. None of the Scandinavian countries nor
a country from the traditional Central Europe belongs to this
par ticular grouping. Material deprivation and/or poverty may be
a more serious problem than anticipated. Not all households
are families (the former stands as an economic unit) but the
bad shape of their economic situation seems to put significant
pressure on their ability to provide support to their members
in need. The case of long-term care is an example for this situa -
tion where limited access to public LTC signify family’s spen -
ding using its limited own resources (Lyberaki, Tinios, Papa -
doudis & Georgiadis, 2019). And this in turn may have its own
implications in the individual’s and/or family’s future.
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Figure 5. Households make ends meet with great
or some difficulty for 50+ population households
in SHARE-W7 countries (EU-25), 2017
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
Table 3 presents three measures about limitations with ac-
tivities cross-country and compares the estimations between
the first (lowest) and the fifth (highest) income quintile. The first
set of this measurement series refers to the Global Activity Li -
mitation Index (GALI), the second refers to the Activities of Dai -
ly Living (ADL) index and the third to the Instrumental Acti -
vities of Daily Living (IADL) index. The GALI is a global single-
item instrument that measures activity limitations for no less
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than six months referring to general health problems and acti -
vities. The ADL index records the number of limitations with six
self-care activities of daily living for no less than three months.
The IADL index records the number of limitations with nine
instrumental activities of everyday life for no less than three
months. The basic research questions these indices try to grasp
is the independence of the respondent as well as his or her need
for support. The estimations for GALI take into account only
the negative outcomes (severely limited or limited as opposed
to not limited). For ADL & IADL indices the estimations are ba -
sed on outcomes with 1+ difficulties because of a physical, men -
tal, emotional or memory problem.7
The GALI scores very high throughout Europe, almost 50%
on average, with the exceptions of Greece and Cyprus (about a
quarter of the particular sample). This index ranges from 31%
to 74% concerning the most poor fifth and from 13% to 46% for
the least poor fifth of the sample. The mean difference by coun -
try and income quintile vary among 11 points in Greece and 45
points in Bulgaria revealing once again significant disparities
and inequalities. Around 12% of the population is experiencing
ADL limitations; ranging from 6% in Cyprus to 19% in Roma-
nia. Belgium scores very high when it comes to lower income
quintile and Slovakia scores very low regarding the highest one.
The difference between these quintiles takes its highest value
also in Bulgaria and its lowest value in Romania. IADL limi-
tations have been experienced by 18% of the sample (from 10%
in Portugal to 26% in Hungary). The ranges between the two
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7. ADL limitations: 1. Dressing, including putting on shoes and socks,
2. Walking across a room, 3. Bathing or showering, 4. Eating, such as cut-
ting up your food, 5. Getting in or out of bed, 6. Using the toilet, including
getting up or down. IADL limitations: 1. Using a map to figure out how to
get around in a strange place, 2. Preparing a hot meal, 3. Shopping for gro -
ceries, 4. Making telephone calls, 5. Taking medications, 6. Doing work around
the house or garden, 7. Managing money, such as paying bills and keeping
track of expenses, 8. Leaving the house independently and accessing trans-
portation services, 9. Doing personal laundry.
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inco me quintiles in question do not overlap at all: 18%-47% for
the lowest & 3%-15% for the highest. A fact which may further
influence the inequalities discussion on this issue. 
Table 3. Limitations with activities for 50+ population
in SHARE-W 7 countries (EU-25), 2017
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Limitations
with…
activities activities
of daily living
instrumental
activities
of daily living
Total 1st Q 5th Q Total 1st Q 5th Q Total 1st Q 5th Q
Austria 51.3 64.3 38.5 10.3 17.0 6.8 19.1 33.5 9.8
Germany 57.8 71.0 45.2 12.9 21.5 5.4 16.5 28.6 8.2
Sweden 43.3 63.0 26.5 8.3 18.4 2.7 11.8 28.6 2.6
Spain 40.1 50.2 28.5 13.0 20.7 4.0 21.0 31.2 7.5
Italy 37.4 50.0 27.7 10.8 17.3 6.3 16.7 23.5 9.4
France 44.6 56.5 34.7 11.6 19.2 7.5 16.8 28.1 12.1
Denmark 41.5 53.8 31.9 8.9 17.5 3.5 15.0 27.6 8.0
Greece 25.7 31.0 20.4 6.7 9.4 3.7 20.4 29.2 13.7
Belgium 50.1 61.1 38.5 15.1 24.3 6.4 22.9 34.2 10.7
Czechia 53.5 64.1 46.0 12.2 21.0 7.4 19.8 34.7 10.6
Poland 56.9 69.8 41.3 14.0 21.1 8.2 18.6 28.4 7.9
Luxembourg 49.4 57.4 40.4 8.6 17.4 5.1 16.2 25.4 8.0
Hungary 50.6 70.3 27.3 9.3 17.5 2.5 25.8 46.7 11.1
Portugal 59.5 64.1 44.7 8.2 16.8 1.5 10.1 20.2 3.3
Slovenia 49.6 64.3 37.1 9.7 20.5 4.7 14.8 31.3 6.2
Estonia 59.3 73.6 38.0 13.9 22.8 5.6 23.0 36.6 8.3
Croatia 54.6 64.9 42.1 12.8 17.4 10.5 21.2 30.6 15.0
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Figure 6 illustrates findings based on the EURO-D depres-
sion scale & caseness for three large age-groups in 11 European
countries.8 In this subsample of the total population it is evident
that the oldest old part may suffer the most regarding depres-
sion problems. The scale scores as well as the scores of caseness
are particular high in the Mediterranean and Poland. For six
countries (Sweden, Spain, Italy, France, Greece and Poland)
the pattern is rather clear: increasing depression scores by older
age group. For Germany and Denmark, the U shape discloses
a different pattern although for Austria, Czechia and Belgium
depression problems seems to be attached mainly to the old-
est old population. The number of older individuals facing this
mental health condition is unprecedented and this is expected
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8. The sample size for this exercise differs because it refers only to re -
gu lar panel respondents from 11 SHARE European countries. Variables for -
ming the EURO-D scale: depression, pessimism, suicidality, guilt, sleep, inte -
rest, irritability, appetite, fatigue, concentration, enjoyment, tearfulness. The
scale can have a max score of 12 ‘very depressed’ & a min score of 0 ‘not
depressed’. A scale score of 4 plus is categorized as ‘caseness’ or case of dep -
ression.
Lithuania 50.6 60.9 29.9 15.1 20.8 4.2 20.7 29.7 5.2
Bulgaria 44.0 65.6 20.6 14.1 23.1 4.1 22.5 41.4 5.5
Cyprus 27.9 41.7 13.4 6.1 10.1 4.8 16.9 28.4 10.8
Finland 49.3 52.6 39.2 9.2 15.0 5.5 12.5 18.3 7.2
Latvia 50.8 61.1 29.0 11.4 17.3 2.7 20.1 29.1 6.9
Malta 31.6 41.3 23.4 6.8 8.8 2.6 16.2 24.5 8.6
Romania 52.7 53.6 39.1 19.2 16.5 12.4 22.2 22.6 12.3
Slovakia 36.5 58.2 18.3 6.7 14.7 1.5 16.8 26.6 6.4
Total 47.8 59.6 35.5 12.1 19.3 6.0 17.9 28.5 9.1
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
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to rise even more and serious challenges for their families and
their social networks (if there is any for support) as well for the
welfare state policies (in place already or absent at this time).
Figure 6. Depression scale EURO-D & EURO-D caseness
by age-group for 50+ population in SHARE-W7 countries
(EU-11), 2017
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
Figures 7 & 8 display the magnitude of two addressed needs
by three large age groups: to consult a doctor and hospital over -
nights. According to this data during a 12-month period, a Eu-
ropean has been seen or talked to a doctor 6 times on average
and 15% of this population has been in a hospital overnight. So
far it is to be expected that these figures vary dramatically by
country and age group. In reference to consultations with doc-
tors the number increases by age group: 5 for the younger group
(50-64), 6.6 for the group 65-79 years old, and 8.3 for the oldest
old. The same stands for the proportion of these three groups
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in reference to hospital overnights, 11%, 16%, 23% respectively.
The individuals aged 80 or older in Italy have almost triple con -
sultations than their counterparts in Romania. Regarding the
age group 65-79 years old and the proportions of hospital over -
night the range is almost 5: from 5% of this population in Gree -
ce to 25% in Austria. Despite the large variations or perhaps be -
cause of them there is no concrete pattern across Europe. Even
if the need for medical consultation or admission to a hospital
can be the same for these individuals there are so many diffe -
rences in the health care systems around Europe as concerns
their coverage and responses; and not only that. 
Figure 7. Consultations with doctors for 50+ population
by age-group in SHARE-W7 countries (EU-25), 2017
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
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Figure 8: Hospital overnights for 50+ population
by age-group (%) in SHARE-W7 countries (EU-25), 2017
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
The analysis reveals serious socioeconomic differences when
it comes to doctor visits and hospital stays. Individuals cate-
gorized into the most income-poor households of the sample
have a mean value of 6.8 consultations with doctors while those
from the least income-poor households have 5.2. The findings
have the same direction regarding hospital overnights: 17.8%
and 11.4% respectively. Is this some kind of reversed inequal-
ity and where the unmet needs or even unnecessary treatment
of the population fit in? In a very limited space and apart from
other possible and more comprehensive explanations, the im-
portance of good health stands out. Table 4 present self-per-
ceived health statuses (from poor to excellent) in reference to
the educational attainment (from none to tertiary) of the indi -
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viduals.9 The relative ratios below reflect significant health dis-
parities because of different socioeconomic factors. With very
few exceptions the individuals with none or primary education
along with the individuals with secondary education have less
probabilities acknowledging a good health status than those
with tertiary education (reference group). It is only to be ex-
pected that such socioeconomic inequalities will continue to ac-
cumulate pressure to the welfare state institutions together
with the evolution of the ageing population.
Table 4. Relative self-perceived health status
and educational attainment for 50+ population
in SHARE-W7 countries (EU-25), 2017
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Reference
group: 
tertiary
education
None or primary
education
Secondary
education
RR 95% CI RR 95% CI
Austria 0.60*** 0.515 0.694 0.74*** 0.657 0.828
Germany 0.44*** 0.322 0.595 0.72*** 0.663 0.788
Sweden 0.68*** 0.601 0.781 0.76*** 0.682 0.848
Spain 0.65*** 0.528 0.795 0.84 0.690 1.035
Italy 0.66*** 0.555 0.794 0.71*** 0.597 0.855
France 0.60*** 0.530 0.683 0.76*** 0.682 0.849
Denmark 0.64*** 0.559 0.727 0.79*** 0.737 0.850
Greece 0.72*** 0.622 0.837 0.88 0.759 1.018
Belgium 0.57*** 0.509 0.639 0.78*** 0.714 0.852
9. The multinomial logistic regression’s reference group of individuals
with tertiary education derives by the ISCED codes 5 & 6). For none or pri -
mary education the grouping use ISCED codes 0 & 1 and for the secondary
edu cation the ISCED codes 2-4. Statistical significance at p<0,001, p<0,01
& p<0,05.
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Concluding remarks
Ageing does not happen in a social vacuum. In fact, the transfor -
mation of the European society, in general as well as in every
country across the old continent, follows a series of changes and
adjustments. For example, the new demographic profile cannot
be separated from what is taking place in labour market and
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Czechia 0.48*** 0.385 0.595 0.79** 0.659 0.946
Poland 0.61*** 0.517 0.713 0.73*** 0.654 0.820
Luxembourg 0.45*** 0.350 0.567 0.66*** 0.534 0.822
Hungary 0.20*** 0.079 0.525 0.60*** 0.488 0.739
Portugal 0.72 0.420 1.221 1.13 0.644 1.999
Slovenia 0.43*** 0.350 0.526 0.62*** 0.545 0.699
Estonia 0.42*** 0.318 0.563 0.66*** 0.600 0.720
Croatia 0.64*** 0.543 0.743 0.76*** 0.677 0.852
Lithuania 0.51*** 0.370 0.697 0.69*** 0.605 0.781
Bulgaria 0.57*** 0.466 0.699 0.76*** 0.675 0.851
Cyprus 0.57*** 0.460 0.699 0.78* 0.638 0.958
Finland 0.56*** 0.440 0.699 0.63*** 0.537 0.742
Latvia 0.40*** 0.273 0.580 0.71*** 0.605 0.830
Malta 0.78* 0.619 0.986 0.74** 0.593 0.928
Romania 0.51*** 0.402 0.636 0.66*** 0.550 0.782
Slovakia 0.72 0.384 1.345 0.70*** 0.582 0.851
Total 0.66*** 0.627 0.698 0.74*** 0.711 0.768
S o u r c e: SHARE wave 7 dataset, 2019.
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education. The declining fertility rates are among other things
interconnected with significant changes in family structures
and trends around Europe. At the same time migration offers
new opportunities as well as new challenges. Taking good care
of fewer children and even more senior citizens requires im-
portant adaptations as concerns the social support institutions
(from pre-school to nursing homes and from housing to home
care). The need for effective health care systems and supporti -
ve social networks is of utmost importance in the new social set -
ting. A positive outcome for all these links is not secured, by
far, even in one of the richest regions in the whole world. Euro -
pe’s social protection system while one of the strongest world-
wide varies significantly across its borders. Balancing (or unba -
lancing) between social expenditures and social investments the
overall costs are substantial and also necessary. 
Living longer and living healthier are not synonyms so far
but two interconnected dimensions. For Europe and its welfare
states in every country the goal seems straightforward: while the
former expanding the latter must expand at greater speed. The
European welfare state will be unavoidably in dispute once again
because of the distance in question. Population ageing may threa -
ten the public finances but the ageing process as it is first and
foremost threatens the people themselves. The ageing population
is not defined solely by biological factors. Perhaps not even that
because of this broad definition (people close to retirement or
after the retirement age, oldest old) and also because the defi -
nition will remain adjustable in the near future. In any case the
old age population is not characterized by its homogeneity. Ve -
ry different life paths of so many individuals cannot be merged
conveniently into one large age-defined group. Welfare state re-
sponses have to be proactive and diverse in order to be effi-
cient. At every cut off point of each working definition of the
aged, one can find many cross pathways: employment, education,
income, family etc. For the ageing population these pathways
were significant in the past and continue to be significant for its
present and future situation. 
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Differences and inequalities in old age have been recogni -
zed in Europe and worldwide in a systematic way. For more than
a half of a century the research on age and ageing has tended
to concentrate on individual adjustment to old age and in turn,
on narrow functionalist explanations of depressed social status
(Walker 1981). Subsequently, in the political arena and academia
the elderly has been treated as a single uniform group facing
all issues in common. During the same period the problems of
the elderly were expected to be confronted in the same man-
ner. Poverty and poor health status, for example, imposed as
the principal problem faced unvaried by each individual mem-
ber of the ageing population. The very strong connections be-
tween health and income or between the health status and the
working conditions, as they have been established by various
empirical studies during the last decades (Wise 2004, Jurges 2008,
Avendano et al, 2009), suggests that ageing may be seen also as
an evolutionary stage in which a set of differences and inequa -
lities rooted in previous periods will be imposed to the present
time of the aged individuals having a number of physical and
social effects. In the case of pensions these differences are ex-
plicit by simple comparisons of individuals with or without in-
terruptions in their working life, specialized or unskilled wor -
kers, state employees or employees in the private sector. As con-
cerns the retired population these ingrained inequalities over
the working life are prone to be diffused to positive or negative
outcomes (Lyberaki, Tinios, Papadoudis, & Georgiadis, 2017). It
is very unlikely that inequality among future generations of ol -
der people will not be greater than today cause of the divisions
that have grown in the labor market since the last decades will
continue to carry forward into the retirement years (Myles, 1997).
The inequalities are significantly more important when gender
is included in the analysis as well as the marital status. Coun-
tering functionalist and neo-classical theories of ageing this
analytical approach attempts to recognize the individual prob-
lems of the aged as issues of general public interest who calls
for further research and political action in a broader environ-
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ment. (Estes, Biggs & Phillipson 2003). That environment corres -
ponds rather to alternate forms of social stratification than sim-
ple age distributions; based for example on structures of employ -
ment, status and property (Kerbo, 2006, Crompton 2004). In
this context it is argued that multiple factors influence the life
of the elderly simultaneously and age is just one of them. Mari -
tal status & family, gender, nationality, social class, status, the
relevant position in the economic & property structure, the re -
lation with the labor market are all specific factors that should
be taken into account when the aims of scientific research lies
in the needs and the corresponding policies of the aged indi-
viduals. 
This paper supports with clarity that all individuals do not
age following the same standard. In many ways they age dif-
ferently because they and their household or families (if any)
accumulate unequally during their lives. The acquired socioe-
conomic status continue to play an important role during the
later years of any individual. Poverty and social exclusion of the
older people in contrast to active and healthy ageing remain
different realities of different people dependent on divergent
pathways over the life course through the given social structu -
res. Moreover, these outcomes may significantly affect the ways
the future needs of the older individuals will be addressed. The -
re is a great distance separating a lone and poor elder from one
wealthy with a big and supportive family network. The data dri-
ven analysis provide alternative interpretations to the ageing cri -
sis trying to disconnect it by its one-sided contingent solely on
budgetary restraints and dependency ratios. Demography is not
history and a story of chaos seems inadequate to describe pro-
ductive answers for policy-making. The challenges for the wel-
fare state in the old continent are escalating and this is not the
time for pause. 
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